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Financial regulation plays a critical role in the provision of a stable banking sector 
however this role requires significant resources in the form of time, finance and human 
capital. Resources that at best, are barely sufficient in developing economies. The major 
banks in developing countries are listed on the stock exchanges therefore providing 
another, although weak, disciplining mechanism to compliment the efforts of the 
regulator. 
This paper explores the efficiency of the market disciplining mechanism for banks listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) using a traditional Event Study 
methodology. Two approaches are used. The first aggregates the earnmgs 
announcements of banks in the industry and the second splits the earnings 
announcements into different 'News' categories (Bad News, No News or Good News). 
As daily returns data is non-normal this necessitates the use the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns when the earnings announcements are combined. However, when the data are 
split into the News categories both the t test and the Wilcoxon Rank test find similar 
results. The paper finds that investors react quicker when the event is Bad News and the 
reaction begins before the announcement is made and persists for several days after. It is 
also found that investors in bank equity react to more than just the fundamentals of the 
concerned equity resulting in persistent abnormal returns. Furthermore the process of 
information dissemination is weak resulting in firstly a delayed reaction to news and 
then secondly a post-announcement drift. 
From these results the paper concludes that more research into the channels used to 
release information is needed, so as to establish who knows what and when, and once 
the information is known, how long it takes to act on it. Secondly, more research into 
the drivers of persistent abnormal returns on the JSE needs to be conducted in order to 











I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Professor Haim Abraham, for his 
assistance in pointing me in the right direction with helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
His time and effort were greatly appreciated. Thank you to the Staff of The School of 
Economics for their unfaltering support throughout. 
To my mother, Ms. Shupi Bvumbe, for being the truly great woman you are - Thank 
you; and thank you for all the support and encouragement. My brothers, Ndanatseyi and 
Vernon for trying to keeping me balanced - I love you guys! And last, but not least, my 
irrepressible Aunt, Marge Zvimba, for being such an inspiration. 













List of Tables 
List of Figures 






2 Literature Review 2 
What is Market Discipline 2 
The Importance of Market Discipline 4 
Limitations of Market Discipline 5 
Equity Markets vs. Subordinated Notes and Debentures - Which is Best? 6 
Subordinated Notes and Debentures 6 
Equity Markets 8 
Event Studies and the Impact of Earnings Announcements on Equity 9 
Prices 
Market Efficiency in Developing Countries 
Market Efficiency and Modelling Returns Volatility 
1 1 
12 
3 Methodology 14 
Outline of the Data 14 
Description of the Model 16 
Calculating Abnormal Returns 18 
Testing the Significance of Abnormal Returns - Parametric and Non- 19 
Parametric Tests 
4 Empirical Findings and Analysis 21 
Preliminary Data Analysis 21 
Estimation of the Coefficients 22 
Grouping Events By News Category 25 
Significance of Abnormal Returns under News Categories 27 












List of Tables 
Page 
Table 1: Stakeholder Monitors (SHM) 3 
Table 2: Conditions for Market Discipline 3 
Table 3: List of Banks Used In the Analysis 15 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 21 
Table 5: Coefficients of the Independent Variables 22 
Table 6: AARs and CAARs for the Industry as a Whole 24 
Table 7: Non-Parametric Test Results 24 
Table 8: AAR and CAAR as per News Category 25 
Table 9: Average AARs Pre and Post the Event Day 0 27 
Table 10: Results of Significance Tests for AARs as Per News Category 28 
Table 11: Results of Significance Tests for CAARs as Per News Category 29 











List of Graphs and Figures 
Figure I: The Anatomy of Market Discipline 
Figure 2: A Timeline of the Event Window 
Figure 3: Graph of AARs and CAARs 
Figure 4: Graph of AARs for the different News Categories 


















The importance of market discipline as a complementary force to formal supervision, in 
regulating financial institutions and maintaining stability in the financial sector, is 
receiving increasing support from empirical evidence. As financial institutions become 
more complex and innovative, it has become increasingly apparent that official 
regulators do not have the resources to meet the additional monitoring requirements. It 
is against this background that the importance and attractiveness of sharper incentives 
for private stakeholders has grown. As a result regulators need to ask the following: To 
what extent can the market be relied upon to discipline institutions, given the 
restrictions imposed by the cost of information gathering faced by the private market 
participants? 
In developing countries the need to develop and promote market discipline is even more 
evident. The absence of adequate safety nets and the inability of individual depositors to 
absorb losses during a bank failure, added to the official regulators lack of resources, 
provide a strong case for market discipline. The lack of information available to poorer 
depositors makes them overly reliant on the efforts of the Central Bank. While on the 
other hand investors in developing markets do have access to information but possibly 
free-ride on the efforts of the Central Bank on two accounts. By ensuring listed banks 
are sound, the Central Bank firstly protects the investor's investment (equity) and 
secondly, the investor's deposits (both demand and term). 
Investors in bank equity may have to shoulder part of the responsibility of ensuring 
banks act prudently. Although there is extensive evidence as to the existence of market 
discipline, the majority of the literature provides evidence on the U.S economy. In 
recent years more studies have been conducted on non-U.S. economies, including 
developing countries, such as Argentina, Mexico and Columbia. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the efficiency of the JSE in disciplining 
listed banks by testing for the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Evidence of semi-










correctly assimilated into prices. In this case the central bank may look to financial 
markets for complimentary signals to it regulatory efforts. The lack of semi-strong 
efficiency will suggest one or more of the following - Insider Trading, poor information 
dissemination, inadequately skilled investors (to deal with the information timeously), a 
poor forecasting model or that the market is not driven primarily by the fundamental 
value of firms. 
In the latter case regulators may seek to enhance the regulation along with the efficiency 
of the information flow in order to promote market discipline. The paper proceeds as 
follows. In Section 2 a review of the literature is conducted. The section discusses the 
merits of market discipline, the financial instruments that are available to regulators in 
promoting it and which are most appropriate in developing countries. As market 
discipline is built on market efficiency the section also provides a background on the 
existing literature and the debate around tests for semi-strong market efficiency. Section 
3 outlines the model used and two tests, one parametric and a non-parametric test for 
the hypothesis. The results are discussed in Section 4 and conclusion presented in 
Section 5. 
2. Literature Review 
What Is Market Discipline? 
The term Market Discipline tends to cover a wide range of activities in its use. Lane 
(1993) as quoted in Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) defines it as " ... financial markets 
providing signals that lead borrowers to behave in a manner consistent with their 
solvency", while Greenspan (200 I) describes it as " ... private counterparty supervision" 
taking two forms: Direct Discipline and Indirect Discipline (Federal Reserve, 2000). 
Direct Market Discipline refers to the pressure applied to banks by investors through the 
interest rate paid on debt (e.g. Subordinated debt), deposits and or the equity markets. 
Investors will demand higher interest payments on subordinated debt in instances where 
the institution is performing poorly. Indirect Market Discipline is that which comes 
from regulators after they analyse prices in the secondary market (Ghosh and Das, 











debt, it could be an indication that investors observe current, or anticipate future, poor 
performance (See Figure 1 below, for a flow diagram on Market Discipline). Calomiris 
and Powell (2000) define "Market Discipline as [the] reactions of private debt holders 
to bank actions such that the bank is penalised for increasing the default risk on its debt, 
either by a higher risk premium on debt, or by the withdrawal of debt." 
Table 1: Stakeholder Monitors (SHM) 
Supervisory Agencies Debt-Holders 
Rating Agencies Depositors 
Market Traders Managers 
Shareholders Borrowers 
Board of Directors Employers 
Source. Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) 
The role of market discipline is to, through Stakeholder Monitors (SHMs) (Table I); 
monitor the behaviour of financial institutions (Llewellyn and Mayes, 2003). Official 
monitors do not have perfect or complete information and furthermore suffer the 
possibility of regulatory forbearance. Each SHM faces a different set of incentives when 
deciding when and how to apply effort in monitoring an institution, increasing the 
probability of detecting problems. 
Table 2 below identifies 8 necessary conditions (Llewellyn and Mayes, 2003) for 
market discipline to be effective. 
Table 2: Conditions/or Market Discipline 
I Disclosure - Relevant, accurate and timely information must be available to all SHMs 
2 There must be a sufficient number of SHMs available and capable of analysing the information. 
Incentives - these must be clear for the SHMs. This includes the risk of losing money. However, 
3 potential benefits must exceed costs. 
4 A sufficient number of SHMs need to adiust their behaviour based on the information. 
The reaction must be rational; so that it is evident SHMs are not subject to the same errors as the 
5 banks. 
6 The rational responses should lead to equilibrating changes in market quantities and/or prices. 
7 Bank managers must be aware of, and be able to respond appropriately to the market changes 
8 From the above conditions it is clear markets should factor risks into their prices. 
Source.' Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) 
If anyone of the above conditions are absent or impeded In any manner the market 
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complete information (Oda, 1999). This is not to say markets have perfect and complete 
information, but the two can complement each other given their differing incentives, as 
actions by the one will provide information for the other. Therefore, by increasing the 
number of agents directly monitoring banks, problems will be identified earlier. 
Market Discipline is an important element in ensuring the overall soundness of the 
banking systems and maintaining financial stability (Baumann and Nier, 2003). 
Although a bank may be within regulatory limits pertaining to risk, the risk profile 
chosen may not be in the interest of depositors. Secondly, neither will a bank 
necessarily take into account the likely social impact of its private decision on risk 
(Baumann and Nier 2003). If financial markets play their correct role, consumers will 
express their risk choice by choosing those banks that match their risk profile 
(Witherell, 2003). By being able to freely choose the banks with the best risk profile, 
creditors are able to punish excessive risk-taking by banks. Thereby improving the 
efficiency of the system as a whole by pressuring inefficient banks to improve or exit 
(Ghosh and Das, 2002). 
Limitations on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline 
Effective market discipline needs a rigorous disclosure framework, and this seems to be 
a major drawback in emerging, and some industrialised countries (Mishkin 2000). This 
inadequacy may stem from ineffective business laws as well as insufficiently 
independent external auditors. The role of independent auditors cannot be understated, 
as financial accounts must provide a true and fair view of the company in order for 
market prices to be accurate (Basel Committee, 1997). 
Secondly, the private cost of market monitoring and information collection may exceed 
the private benefit. This is especially so for the smaller depositors, who may take longer 
to recover from a bank failure. Thirdly, social costs are not factored into market prices 
for debt, specifically because markets are concerned with private rather than social 
costs. Fourthly, the existence of an overly prominent supervisory agent may result in 
private SHMs "free-riding" on its efforts. In such a situation banks may not be 











2003). Fifthly, perfect market discipline requires that not only must there be perfect 
information, but that SHMs have the necessary skills to carry out the required risk 
assessments. Finally, where rating agencies are concerned it may not be economical for 
rating agencies to conduct full credit ratings. 
Gathering from the above, the availability of information is critical for an effective 
market discipline mechanism. In developed nations, information is readily available. 
Studies have however tended to focus on subordinate debt and the responsiveness of 
deposit interest rates to banking ratios. Few studies have attempted to address directly 
the responsiveness of bank equity to new information. In Africa, there are even fewer 
studies. The existing studies offer a more general analysis of market efficiency, where 
they look at the broader stock market. This paper contributes to the existing literature on 
financial regulation by exploring the potential benefit of market monitoring to bank 
regulators in complimenting their on and off-site monitoring and examination tools by 
investigating market reactions to certain events. 
Equity Markets vs. Subordinated Notes and Debentures - Which is Best? 
There are 2 main approaches put forward in the I iterature with regards to effecting 
market discipline. The first is the issuing of Subordinated Notes and Debentures (SNDs) 
by financial institutions. This debt is junior to all other credit held by the bank. The 
second does not involve the issuing of any more obligations, but rather the sharpening 
of incentives for equity holders. Both approaches have their benefits and drawbacks, 
and regulators need to weigh these up before deciding which best suits their sector. 
Subordinated Notes and Debentures 
Subordinated debt instruments are financial instruments that are both unsecured and 
junior to other debt held by a firm (Bank of Canada (2005), Basel Committee (2003)). 
They partly rely on the ability of spreads to reflect bank risk. As with other bonds its 
risk can be measured by comparing its yield to that of a risk-free instrument such as a 
treasury bill. However, they also reflect other 'noise' in the economy, and hence 











debt in the bond market can provide regulators with information about the risk profile of 
a bank (K wan, 2002b). The nature of the contracts and covenants governing a banks 
ability to raise debt can play an important role in determining the yield spread of the 
SNDs. Kwan (2002b) further found that in less regulated periods the moral hazard 
problem was greater, and the sensitivity of yield spreads to restrictions in debt issuing 
contracts and covenants was more pronounced. 
SNDs are among the first to lose value when a bank is in trouble (Staff (1999), K wan 
(2002)) and as such are considered best to exert both direct and indirect market 
discipline. When and if a bank's risk profile is increasing, SND holders have an 
incentive to pressure the regulator into PCA - a line of action that may be in contrast 
with that of equity holders (Bank of Canada, 2005). This will contribute to the overall 
robustness of the financial safety net. 
However, the prerequisites for SNDs to successfully discipline banks by reflecting the 
actual level of risk make it difficult if not impossible for them to work in developing 
countries. Firstly, there needs to be a significant number of players within the markets. 
Secondly, these players need to be sufficiently sophisticated in order to extract the 
information contained in SND prices and act upon it. 
Thirdly, the SNDs must constitute a certain percentage of the banks capital in order to 
be most effective. Here the markets in developing countries may not be sufficiently 
deep to absorb the required amount of SNDs to make the mechanism effective. Finally, 
there needs to be credibility underlying the belief that the probability of repayment is 
negatively related to the risk of default. Any implicit guarantee will undermine this. 
Such credibility is difficult to establish, especially where the resources needed to 
provide the safety net are limited. This is especially true (even in developed countries) 
when a bank is deemed too-big-to-fail. 
The major drawbacks of SNDs are those of; firstly, availability, there are few 
instruments, and secondly the few available instruments are concentrated in the hands of 











however, these have concentrated on European and US markets simply because these 
markets are the deepest. 
Equity Markets 
While the focus has been on SNDs there has been a growing amount of discussion on 
the potential of equity markets in disciplining banks (Basel Committee, 2003), 
(Flannery and Nikolova, 2004). The major advantages equity markets hold over SNDs 
is that of data availability and data quality. More financial institutions are listed on stock 
exchanges than those that issue SNDs especially in developing countries. Secondly, as a 
result of the greater number of investors and analysts in equity markets the data quality 
is greater. Finally, equity prices reflect a bank's current condition and can help predict 
future default. The available studies have found equity markets rapidly incorporate new 
information such as credit ratings and supervisory actions (Flannery and Nikolova, 
2004). 
However, again as with SNDs, the interpretation of this data is difficult because of a 
plethora of influences at play. This is evidenced by the amount of research attempting to 
model market behaviour. Secondly, the distorted incentive structure faced by equity 
holders, where there is a positive correlation between risk and return, makes it difficult 
for regulators to observe when the bank is in trouble by analysing its share price. 
The information content of bank data that is availed to markets is critical to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the mechanism. Studies such as Curry, Fissel, and 
Hanweck, (2003) have used various categories of equity data to investigate whether 
they add value to models that are used to predict changes in the central bank ratings 
assigned to banks. Curry et al (2003) find that the variables " ... add statistically and 
economically meaningful value to models" indicating that the markets were able to 
extract valuable information from equity data. 
In a study of the Asian crisis, Hosono, Iwaki and Tsuru (2005) found the ability of 
markets to discipline banks changed significantly after a crisis, as depositors became 











disciplining mechanism was weak before the crisis and there was no credible deposit 
protection scheme to cushion depositors. In a study of Argentina, Chile and Mexico, 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (1999) draw similar conclusions, finding the lack of a 
credible deposit insurance scheme meant depositors had to increase their monitoring 
efforts. 
Event Studies on the Impact of Earnings Announcements on Equity Prices 
From the initial work of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), there has evolved a 
considerably large body of literature using event study methodology in economics and 
finance. The study by Fama et al looked at the reaction (or, more specifically, the 
dividend implication) of securities prices to stock splits, finding that the information 
these announcements contained was factored into prices "almost immediately" after the 
announcement date. Closely tied to the development of this literature is the evolution of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, introduced by Fama in his 1970 dissertation. Since 
then the EMH has evolved from being defined as, " ... a market that adjusts rapidly to 
new information" (Fama et al (1969)), to: 
There are three forms ofEMH: 
I. Weak Form Efficient - With this form of efficiency the share prices include all past 
(historical) price information and technical analysis is ineffective. 
2. Semi-Strong Form Efficient - Asserts that all information that is available publicly 
is fully incorporated into the share price. 
3. Strong Form Efficient - In this case historical, public and insider information IS 
incorporated into the share price. 
No market is perfectly efficient, rather all markets can be placed somewhere along a 
continuum with inefficiency at one end and perfect efficiency at the other - with the 
markets of the more developed countries being found nearer the 'efficient' end. A 1970 
study by Fama led to the conclusion that there was strong empirical support for the 
existence of weak-form efficiency in equity markets. Indeed during the 1970s and 80s 
there was strong support for this view. However, more recent studies have found 











although the question being raised is whether the underlying theory is incorrect or the 
existing models are inadequate (Dimson and Mussavian, 2000). 
Ball and Brown (1968) approached the issue of market efficiency by investigating the 
informational content of earnings announcements. They conclude that final reports are 
not the best indicators of the state of a firm, but rather agents use other media sources 
(e.g. interim reports), as they are timelier. A drawback with their study is the use of 
monthly returns. Events occur on a given day, and there is the possibility of the market 
reacting to other information within the same month making it difficult to isolate the 
impact of the event itself. 
Brown and Warner (1980) assess the various market performance measurements in an 
attempt to (1) find which model best predicts 'normal' returns and (2) whether it is 
important to know the event date. They found no significant difference in the predictive 
power of the models but found that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
abnormal returns was reduced significantly if the event day was not known. The use of 
daily return date has brought the added advantage of being able to more accurately 
investigate abnormal returns around the event day. However, a number of issues arise 
from the use of daily returns data. Using daily returns data Brown and Warner (1985) 
find although there are unique problems presented by daily returns data they are easily 
overcome. 
Using confidential regulatory information along with market information, Berger, 
Davies and Flannery (2000) attempt to find which party knows what and when? They 
use two measures of supervisory information, the BOPEC rating and the frequency of 
on-site inspections. From the market they take four measures, abnormal stock returns; 
Moody's ratings of outstanding debentures; the proportion of outside equity owned by 
corporate insiders and the proportion owned by institutional investors. Using Granger 
causality tests the authors find the Moody ratings and supervisory assessments Granger 
cause each other inversely with the lag size. However, the causality between 
supervisory assessments and equity markets is at the most very weak. They explain this 











concerned with the default risk of banks, whereas equity markets look more to assessing 
and predicting the future performance of the bank. The evidence suggests that 
supervisors, rating agencies and equity markets all produce valuable information that 
complements the efforts of the others. Furthermore, Berger et al find that supervisory 
ratings are only useful for a limited time frame, after which they become 'stale'. This is 
probably due to the discrete and infrequent nature of ratings. Comparing three market 
indicators: accounting data, share prices and credit ratings (all of which can be 
calculated from publicly available information) Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (200 I) 
find that none of the measures had any predictive power prior, ex post, to the Asian 
crisis. Furthermore each indicator followed a different pattern, possibly related to the 
differing transaction costs associated with each. However, Krainer and Lopez (2001) 
find that equity markets send a clear signal well in advance of a ratings change, while 
Muslumov (2003), in a study focused on the Turkish banking sector, finds equity 
markets adjusting several weeks before a bank is placed under curatorship indicating 
private agents' awareness of a problem. 
Market Efficiency in Developing Markets 
Studies conducted on the efficiency of African Markets are few, with the majority 
focused on the JSE, primarily because there is limited data available to researchers in 
other African countries, although the situation is improving. Of the studies conducted, 
the general conclusion is that the African markets are weak-form efficient (Dickinson 
and Muragu (1994); Magnusson and Wydick (2000); and Adelegan (2003)). Dickinson 
and Muragu (1994) fail to find evidence that "[does] not contradict the weak form of the 
EMH" on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Following on from Dickinson and Muragu 
(1994) and comparing 8 stock exchanges through out Africa, Magnusson and Wydick 
(2000) find all except Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe to be weak form efficient. 
Mlambo, Biekpa and Smit (2003) tested for weak-form efficiency in selected African 
markets and again found this form of efficiency to be present in only a few of them. The 
authors, because of the non-normality of the data, recommended non-parametric tests 
for further studies as these would give less biased results. These studies aside, there is 
little evidence as to research on the responsiveness of African bank stocks to earnings 











However, all authors make a common caveat that more studies need to be completed 
before any solid conclusions can be drawn about African stock markets, individually or 
in general. Event Studies on JSE listed entities are substantially more and Bhana (1995) 
found that information is incorporated slowly into share prices and that the market does 
not react efficiently to publicly available information. Using an Abnormal Index on the 
returns of JSE listed companies Philpott and Firer (1995) found there were persistent 
abnormal returns that could not be explained by a liquidity premium. The abnormality 
could be due to a significant premium attached by investors where due to delays In 
information dissemination losses could be incurred. 
Adelegan (2003) tests for semi-strong form efficiency in the Nigerian Stock market 
using daily returns data and finds insufficient evidence of the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency. Two of the problems Adelegan (2003) identifies are common 
through developing countries - Insider Trading and Poor Communication Infrastructure. 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson and Kehr (2000) use an event study approach used by 
Brown and Warner (1985) and the Corrado (1989) rank correlation test to test the 
Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) for market efficiency. Using 
corporate news announcements the authors find a lack of news impact on the share price 
of the company concerned. They give two reasons for the lack of responsiveness around 
the event data. Firstly, there is the likelihood of insider trading and secondly the lack of 
responsiveness is restricted to a particular class of shares, A-shares, which only citizens 
may hold. Non-citizens may hold only B-class shares that were found to display a 
significantly greater responsiveness to news as it released. 
Market Efficiency and Modelling Returns Volatility 
Although in finance the standard model for event studies has been the market model, its 
suitability has been questioned (Shiller (1981 a), Shiller (1981 b), LeRoy and Porter 
(1981 )). The smoothing properties of existing models do not allow for the variation 
shown by actual prices to accurately model price behaviour. 
Using a simple efficient markets model Shiller (1981 a)1 defines its structure as: 
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Y = -- where r (constant) is the discount rate. 
1+ r 
An implication of the above model is that innovation in price (the left-hand side of the 
equation below) which cannot be forecast can be restated as below. 
Giving: 
E (~p + d - rp ) = 0 I 1+ I I { 
The above expression may not hold exactly if changes in p reflect other market driving 
forces such as fads or waves of market optimism or pessimism to the extent that L'lPt+l 
swamps (rpt - dt). 
Shiller (1981 a) derives three inequalities that must hold: 
a(p)~ a(p*) 
(









Of the three inequalities I-I and 1-2 are violated. Using Standard & Poors data from the 











cr(p*) and cr(~p) is 6 times larger than cr( d)/~(2r). For 1-2 to hold the standard deviation 
of the dividend series would have to be 7.3 instead of 1.28. 
Secondly, Shiller (1981 a) highlights the lack of observed variation in the dividend time 
series that would be necessary to compensate for the lack of variation in ~p. Attempts to 
reconcile the data with empirical evidence have suggested a random walk model for dt, 
large movements in the ex ante interest rate or that markets are irrational and subject to 
fads. Another explanation for the behaviour of dividends is that dividends at times 
represent changes in the firm's policy for earnings retention (Copeland, 1983). 
Criticism of Shiller (1981 a) by Flavin (1983) along with Marsh and Merton (1984) 
centred on the small sample properties of volatility tests and their bias toward finding 
excess volatility. This led Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) to formulate a more 
robust set of volatility tests that took into account the criticisms. The authors 
nevertheless still find that the model fails to account adequately for movements in the 
stock price. In their conclusions Mankiw et al (1985) suggest that possible reasons 
could be that the null hypothesis of efficient markets could be true, and the violations of 
the inequalities could be statistically insignificant. Secondly, as suggested by Shiller 
(1981 a), Mankiw et al (1985) propose the market fluctuations could be caused by 
changes in the discount rate induced by changes in the real interest rate. Finally, the 
markets could be driven by "animal spirits" or fads that restrict its ability to reflect 
market fundamentals. It certainly seems plausible that "something" more than 
fundamentals drives the market, since company announcements are not a daily, nor 
necessarily a weekly, occurrence yet shares are traded more frequently. 
3. Methodology 
Outline of the Data 
The industry specific daily returns dataset used is from the period 1996 to 2004 for 7 
South African Banks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (see Table 3 below). 
To qualify for inclusion in the dataset, a bank must have been listed for at least 4 years 











that drove down its share price. These two criteria excluded Capitec Bank that was 
listed in 2002 and only had 2 events that qualified for the data set; and Mercantile 
Lisbon Bank. Mercantile Bank was listed on the JSE on the 12th August 1998 with a 
share price ofR4.00 (400 cents) and by the 5th of July 2002 the share price had dropped 
sharply to RO.07 (7 cents) per share. 
Table 3: List of Banks Used In the Analysis 
BANK ABBREVIATION 
AFRICAN BANK INVESTMENT LIMITED ABIL 
AMALGAMA TED BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA ABSA 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK FNB 
INVESTEC LIMITED INVL 
NEDCOR NEDR 
RAND MERCHANT BANK HOLDINGS RMBH 
ST ANDARD BANK STAN 
The data is sourced from McGregor's and to be included in the study each earnings 
announcement was treated as an event and each event had to have 60 days of daily 
returns prior to the earnings announcement and 30 days of returns after the 
announcement (see Figure 2 for the Event timeline). Earnings announcement dates are 
taken as the Event Day where t=O. Dividends were declared at the same time. Daily 
returns for the 90-day period surrounding the Event Day make up the Event Window 
(t=-60, ... , +30). The Event Period is a sub-sample of the Event Window and is 
represented by days t=-10, ... , + 1 O. The decision on the size of the event window is ad 
hoc and is designed so as to provide enough data to run the regression models, without 
including periods in which quarterly and semi annual announcements are made. In 
choosing the event period, days either side of the event day were chosen so as to capture 
the initial changes in investor behaviour pre and post the event or announcement day. 
The data on event days /=-60, ... , -11 make up the Estimation Period. Fama et al (1969) 
explain well the reasoning behind the estimation period data not including the returns 
close to the event day. In the period close to and around the event day returns are 
expected to be abnormal, therefore including these in the estimations of a and p will 



















Description of the Model 
There are a number of models used in event study analysis, and comparisons on the 
strengths of each one are weIl dealt with in papers such as Bowman (1983), Brown and 
Ball (1980), MacKinlay (1997). The study uses the Sharpe (1964) Market Model and 
follows the standard event study procedures as outlined in MacKin lay (1997) and Serra 
(2002) The market model proceeds by regressing the returns of a security i, against the 
contemporaneous returns of the market. Abnormal returns are calculated using the 
coefficients from the model. 
Firstly, returns are calculated as the relative increase in price of security i from period t-
1 to period t. This can be expressed as equation (1) below: 
R,," (p,.,- ~': D,II 
Where: 
R" = Return on Security i in period t; 
P, = Price of security i in period t; 
P,./ = Price of Security i in period t-J; 











i = 1, 2, ... ,N (where N=7) 
t = -60,-59, ... ,+30 
Dividends were announced simultaneously and the dividend amount was spread out 
over the year by dividing the dividend amount by 360 so as to obtain the dividend per 
day. Without doing so the dividend would distort the Average Abnormal Returns on the 
event day, along with the cumulative returns after the event day, resulting in a 
significantly higher number of abnormal returns. 
The Market Model is given as: 
Where: 
RII = Return on Security i in period t; 
Rml = Return on the market index in period t; 
0. , = Constant; 
p, = Coefficient estimate; 
£11 = Disturbance term; 
i = 1,2, ... ,N (where N=7) 
t = -60,-59, ... -11 
(2) 
However, because the shares analysed are for a specific sector equation (2) has to be 
adjusted to accommodate industry effects, in this case Bank effects. Requiring the 
addition of a Bank Index to give equation (3) below: 
R = a + f3 R + '1 ·R + c it i ml fL, 1 bl C it 
Where: 
Rhl = Return on the bank index in period t; 












Calculating Abnormal Returns 
To proceed, the abnormal returns are calculated by first estimating the coefficients a, p 
for each individual security by regressing the estimation period returns (t=-60, ... , -11) 
on the bank industry proxy. The abnormal return is then the difference between the 
observed and the predicted return i.e.: 
(4) 
The expected value of the residual is zero and any value # 0 is classified as an abnormal 
return (AR) where: 
(' = 0 
(, II 
Average Abnormal Returns 
I::j it j (5) 
The Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) are derived by averaging the abnormal returns 
across common event time during the event period: 
1 \' N 
AAR,= N'-- 1 ARa fort = -10, ... ,+10 (6) 
To test Ho of no abnormal returns, Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) are 
calculated. The strategy assumed under this test is one of purchasing an asset in one 
period and holding it until the end of another, thus measuring the capital gain in holding 
the security over or through and event (Kothari and Warner, 2004). 
The CAAR is obtained by cumulating the average residuals over a period of L days 
around the event day: 
\' L2 











Testing the Significance of Abnormal Returns - Parametric Test 
Both the AAR and CAAR are tested for significance (Ho: the AAR is equal to zero) 
using the standard t-statistic: 
t = (8) 








N L ARII 
L 10 1 T (10) 10 1 
AR*= 
N 
Because the returns are not independent in event time, the standard deviation must be 
adjusted in order to avoid errors in accepting or rejecting the hypotheses. In cases where 
cross-sectional independence is assumed in error the standard deviation estimation is 
lower than should be, resulting in an upward bias in the t statistic (Kothari and Warner, 
2004). 
Where S(AARt) is an estimation of the standard deviation of AARt calculated using the 
estimation period data. 
Non-Parametric Test 
Parametric tests make distributional assumptions about the data - i.e. that the data is 
normally distributed. However, past research has found abnormal returns to be skewed 
right with fat tailed distributions. A further disadvantage of parametric tests is their bias 











negative abnormal returns. In order to overcome the problem of violated normality 
assumptions, a number of non-parametric tests have been devised in the literature. 
Mainly three tests are used in event studies: The Generalised Sign Test, Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test and Corrado (1989) Rank Test. 
The Corrado (1989) Test provides better specification and power than parametric tests if 
the return variance is unlikely to increase, but is misspecified if the return variance does 
increase over time (Serra, 2002). The Wilcoxon Test is generally viewed to be stronger 
than the Generalised Sign Test because of its greater sensitivity, and is used in this 
paper. 
Calculating the Test Statistic 
The returns are generated as per the market model and ranks assigned to the absolute 
value of the Abnormal Returns: 
Values where Idil = 0 are ignored leaving n' :s n pairs. 
The absolute differences are ranked for the smallest to the largest. In cases where ranks 
are tied the average of the ranks that would be assigned had no tie been present is 
assigned. Summing the positive ranks will give the test statistic 
.. S N( n(n+ 1). n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)] 
The test statIstIc N ~ 4' 24 
Where: 
Z= 
(S - 0.5)- n(n+ 1) 
N 4 -----;===;======;=::;====~- ~ N ( 0; 1 ) 












4. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
Preliminary Data Analysis 
Table 4 below shows the properties of the time series' of the individual variables over 
the period January 1996 to December 2004, after having undergone a I sl differencing. 
From the table below it can be seen that the variables once transformed into returns are 
no longer heavily skewed right and fat-tailed as the original series, although the positive 
mean does indicate skewness. The differenced times series for alI variables although not 
skewed (except RMBH which is slightly skewed), are leptokurtic. This is a 
characteristic of returns calculated using daily share price data, and non-parametric tests 
are suggested as they are not affected by the normality assumption as are the parametric 
tests. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 
ABIL ABSA FNB INVL NEDR RMBH STAN 
Mean 0.001014 0.000558 0.000837 0.000209 0.000454 0.000768 0.000546 
Median 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Max. 0.170507 0.151807 0.148627 0.148564 0.167832 0.189055 0.147826 
Min. -0.260870 -0.164384 -0.110491 -0.132948 -0.134615 -0.169492 -0.169960 
Std. Dev. 0.030651 0.026300 0.024518 0.021381 0.022177 0.026849 0.023930 
Skewness -0.064753 0.092252 0.465878 0.041828 0.284986 0.664134 -0.130831 
Kurtosis 9.651195 7.454282 7.034513 8.199860 7.259497 10.02218 8.443158 
The share price data are time series and possess a unique set of characteristics that must 
be addressed if forecasts are to be meaningful. One problem presented by time series is 
that of non-stationarity. A non-stationary time series possesses a Unit Root, and wilI 
suffer from permanent effects due to random shocks in the economy (Libanio, 2005) 
while also folIowing a random walk. If the series has no Unit Root it is said to be 
stationary and exhibits mean reversion (Libanio, 2005). Testing for stationarity can be 
done using the Augmented Dickey-FulIer (ADF) Test and if the series has a unit root 
(established by failing to reject Ho: Series has Unit Root) the ]'1 difference can be taken 
to render it stationary. 











suggesting first differencing to render the series stationary. However, Event Studies use 
returns that are calculated by taking the growth of the share price from one period to the 
next - i.e. the 151 difference. After first differencing all the variables, including the 
Market (ALSI) and Bank (BANK) Index variables reject Ho in the ADF tests. 
Estimation of the Coefficients 
The first step in the analysis was the estimation of the coefficients a, ~ and A, using 
equation (3) stated in the methodology. The All Share Index and the Bank Index in 
theory are highly correlated and as a result present the problem of multicollinearity. The 
variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.504935 which is high and the use of the two 
as dependant variables would introduce multicollinearity. The solutions are two fold. 
Either, attempting to eliminate multicollinearity by taking the first difference of the 
variables, i.e. the change in the share price regressed on the changes in the ALSI and 
BANK variables. This step is implicit in the methodology as the change in variable in 
each time period is same as the return and the correlation drops to 0.154434 after the 
calculation. The second and alternative step involves dropping one of the independent 
variables. 
The returns for each bank were regressed on at first both the ALSI and BANK 
variables. However in all the regressions the ALSI variable was highly insignificant and 
was dropped from the models. In the second set of regressions with BANK as the only 
independent variable, the constant was insignificant and was dropped as well. Table 5 
below presents the coefficients for a and A in the final set of regressions. The Durbin-
Watson statistic provided evidence that there was no Auto-correlation in any of the 
models except FNB. 
"dents of the Independent Variables Table 5: Coe./.. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
ABIL ABSA FNB INVL NEDR RMBH STAN 
a(Constant) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.555762 -0.936090 -0.968422 -0.735550 -0.875629 -0.860396 -0.972038 
)'(BANK) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
'R2 0.163605 0.462116 0.589170 0.255335 0.577480 0.435655 0.697440 
D-W 1.961660 2.127823 1.805817 1.875952 1.872262 1.876610 2.019692 











The AAlb fo!'the b~nb combined (Figure 3 below) ,"dical~d banks e>.rcrienc"d mixed 
returns for lhe ] V d~) period prior 10 the earnings ~nnouncement. I'he returns are 
negative Irom day -IV through to -5, On day -4 they tum positive and rcm~in POSili\c 
through w!by -3, wilh <ity - I ~~pcrien~ing th~ only negalive rellLm, in ~l"~~n. Tho..'r~ 
is" nolable drop in tl", rale of dlange from day -3 to day + J for nample AAlb average 
0.00065 between days -3 and +3 again't an e\'ent period average 01 -0, OOU88. 
('orr~'pondingly the CAA[{, arc d~erea,ing from day -10 to -5, aller which they rise 
from even l <lay·5 to ~venl da) +3. 11", day.I_3 to 13 eX[l<'rience a relatiwly gradlLa l rise 
in C,\ARs. and as rdk~t~d by lhe t valucs, these are dr;\en by Lns igni/icant AARs 
(column 3 in Tabk (, b~luw). Th~ I""k or"ignifican"~ ,uggC'lS lhi, may be a perioo uf 
lLn~erlainly for i n\'~.'lUfS a, lhq adopt a wail and "'~ approach lu llw nCws 
announcement SlLch aLl approac'h would ,uggest an immediate adjustmcLlt on~c the 
~nnouncement was m~<k, Ilowever, the drill conlinlL"' for a few days aller the 
~nnuunc~m~nt day. mcanLng reaction to the news is ,low, possibly as a result of poor 
infonnation dis>eminalKln 
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rhis i, ,imil~r to the conclusion dr~wn by ,Adckgan (2003) on tile r\ige,.ian Slock 
Fxchangc, Post day +3. AARs drop sharply. before holding at an averag" of -0,0022 to 











individually, contribute to give a highly significant CAAR (significant at the I % level) 
over the period. The negative returns post event day +3 may be the result of 
shareholders oftloading part or all of their holdings upon receiving and processing the 
information content ofthe announcements. 
Table 6: MRs and CAARsfor the Industrv as a Whole 
COMBINED INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
DAY AAR t-stat signif CAAR t-stat signif 
-10 0.0012 0.4925 0.0012 04925 
-9 -00012 -0.4960 00000 -0.0035 
-8 00002 0.0833 0.0002 00798 
-7 -0.0023 -0.9252 -00021 -0.8453 
-6 -00037 -I 4923 -0.0058 -2.3377 •• 
-5 -00012 -04712 -0.0070 -2.8089 ••• 
-4 0.0051 2.0514 •• -00019 -0.7575 
-3 00008 0.3114 -00011 -04460 
-2 0.0009 0.3565 -0.0002 -00895 
-1 -00012 -04605 -00014 -0.5500 
0 00008 0.3211 -00006 -02289 
1 0.0002 00674 -00004 -0.1615 
2 00025 0.9937 0.0021 08321 
3 0.0006 0.2201 0.0026 10522 
4 -0.0078 -3.1204 ••• -0.0052 -2.0682 •• 
5 -00024 -09468 -0.0075 -3.0150 ••• 
6 -00026 -10287 -0.0101 -4.0436 ••• 
7 -00028 -I 1118 -0.0\29 -5.1555 ... 
8 -00017 -06810 -0.0146 -5.8365 ••• 
9 -00018 -07077 -0.0164 -6.5441 ••• 
10 -0.0022 -08695 -0.0185 -7.4137 ••• 
Note.· *, ** and *** indicate Significance at the 1O%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 7' Non-Parametric Test Results 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Output 
N I SN+ I SN. I Z I p-value 
1155 I 318222.50 I 349367.5 I -1.3734 I 0.1696 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was performed on the returns because of the non-
normality of the data. The output in table 7 above fails to find that the returns are 
significantly different from zero. However, because the data sample lumps together 
announcements that may contain differing news it is worth investigating further. As the 
results displayed in table 6 above are for the banking industry as a whole, it suggests 
that over the period under analysis the banks have had predominantly bad 
announcements - the significant and negative CAARs. However, not all announcements 











if the earnings announcements were grouped into various 'News' categories. 
Grouping Event Periods by News Category 
The data was grouped into three "News" categories. Good News, No News and Bad 
News. The methodology for categorising consisted of visually analysing the graphical 
output per bank, of each announcement's event period CAARs. The trends before and 
after event day 0 were analysed so as to establish the direction of the CAARs, and these 
trends were used to classifY the announcement events. They were classified as either, 
Bad News, No News or Good News. The Table below details both the AARs and 
CAARs for each News category over the event period. 
T, hi 8 AAR d CAAR a e : an as per ews ategory 
Bad News No News Good News 
Day AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
-10 0.004987~ 0.004987S -0.001550' -0.001550' 0.000529' 0.000529' 
-9 -0.003255 0.001732( 0.003432C 0.001881 ' -0.004605S -0.004076' 
-8 -0.003713" -0.001980' 0.003453, 0.005335 0.000543C -0.003533' 
-7 -0.007485L -0.009465- -0.003336S 0.001998 0.004362 0.000829 
-6 -0.010295E -0.0197615 -0.000694, 0.001303( -0.000360' 0.000468-
-5 -0.000400S -0.020162L -0.000003t 0.001300( -0.003385C -0.002916 
-4 0.0127371 -0.0074253 -0.004347~ -0.003047L 0.008232~ 0.0053161 
-3 -0.000095S -0.007521 0.0024801 -0.000567 -0.000295~ 0.005020-
-2 0.0007521 -0.0067691 0.001362 0.000795 L 0.000486" 0.005506( 
-I -0.00104r -0.007812L 0.000423i 0.0012191 -0.0031211 0.002385~ 
0 -0.007405 -0.015217 0.000230 0.001449 0.0101691 0.012554( 
1 -0.004902~ -0.0201201 -0.002605t -0.001156 0.00880 I 0.021356( 
2 -0.001295~ -0.021415' -0.003141~ -0.004297( 0.0131101 0.034466( 
3 -0.0074006 -0.028816 -0.002322'\ -0.006620L 0.0123499 0.046816' 
4 -0.017443 -0.046259S -0.0053839 -0.0120041 -0.0004530 0.046363' 
5 -0.0116706 -0.0579306 0.002902 -0.0091016 0.001279G 0.047642' 
6 -0.0050556 -0.0629861 -0.0019633 -0.0110649 -0.0006636 0.046978<; 
7 -0.002863L -0.0658494 -0.004145 -0.0152106 -0.001090~ 0.045888 
8 -0.006595~ -0.072444-; 0.0032611 -0.011949' -0.002365< 0.043523 
9 -0.008538 -0.0809830 -0.0000078 -0.011957 0.003321, 0.046844<; 
10 -0.006296t -0.0872796 -0.0036436 -0.015600S 0.0039154 0.050760 
In each category (except the No News category) there is a marked difference in the 
direction of the CAARs. The increase in cumulative abnormal returns is more 
pronounced for the Bad News, falling from +0.00499 on event day -10 to -0.08728 on 
event day + 1 O. For the No News category the decline in cumulative returns is not as 
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while under the No News the AARs fluctuate around zero. 
A notable observation while examining Figure 5 above, is the behaviour of the 
cumulative returns prior to event day o. The CAARs for all three news categories seem 
to experience little change in the pre-event period relative to the post-event period. This 
is confirmed by the averages of the AARs in Table 9 below. For each news category the 
average of the AARs pre and post event is given. The figure for event day 0 is not 
included in the averages and is given separately for the purpose of comparison. 
T, hI 9 A a e : verage AARP s re an dP h E ost t e vent D 0 ay 
~ve AARs Bad News No News Good News 
IPre-Event -0.00078IL 0.000121~ 0.000238E 
IEvent Day 0 -0.0074053 0.000230~ 0.0101691 
!Post-Event -0.007206 -0.001705C 0.0038205 
lDifference -0.006424CJ -0.001826~ 0.003582C 
The differences in the pre and post event averages are large as reflected in Table 9 
above. In the Bad News category the post-event average is 9.2 times larger than the pre-
event average, while in the Good News category the corresponding average is 16 times 
greater. Intuition would suggest there should be no substantial difference between the 
pre and post event averages for the No News category, however, there is a sizeable 
difference between pre and post-event averages. That said, the size of the No News 
average AARs, relative to the Good and Bad News categories, is small. 
Significance of the Abnormal Returns under News Categories 
When the results are split into the 3 news categories, the number of significant days 
increases. The increase can be explained as being the result of firstly, isolating the No 
News days which seemed to dampen the abnormal returns, prior to the announcement, 
in the other news categories. Secondly, the Bad and Good News abnormal returns 
would cancel each other out resulting in the average being closer to zero. 
Under the News categories the CAARs on day + 1 0 are substantially greater than those 
of the combined industry, except those of the No News category. The AARs and 
CAARs on day -10 are insignificant for both the No News and Good News categories. 











more sensitive to bad news, and is confirmed by the relatively large, and highly 
significant, CAARs from day -7 through to the end of the event period. Both the Bad 
and Good News events experience fewer significant AARs prior to the announcement 
day than after and the returns in this period lack a clear direction with changing signs 
indicating uncertainty amongst investors. The Bad News category experiences 
statistically significant AARs from event day 0, to the end of the period, with only 2 
days (day +2 and +7) experiencing insignificant AARs. 
Events falling under the Good News category experience significant AARs from day ° 
to day +3. These result in the graph of Good News CAARs displaying the typical 
characteristics of cumulated returns. These are: no clear direction prior to the 
announcement, rapid assimilation of the news once the announcement is made and 
finally a levelling out. 
Table 10: Results of Sif:nifjcance Tests for AARs as Per News Category 
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Day Bad News I-stat signif No News I-sIal signif Good News I-sIal s.!!tnif 
-10 00050 1.9937 •• -00016 -06198 00005 0.2116 
-9 -00033 -13012 00034 1.3718 -00046 -1.84\0 • 
-8 -00037 -14842 00035 13805 00005 02170 
-7 -00075 -2.9919 ••• -0.0033 -1.3338 0.0044 1.7438 • 
-6 -00103 -4.1153 ••• -0.0007 -02777 -00004 -0.1441 
-5 -00004 -0.1602 0.0000 -0.0014 -00034 -1.3530 
-4 00127 5.0911 ••• -00043 -I. 7377 • 00082 3.2905 ••• 
-3 -00001 -00383 00025 09913 -0.0003 -0.1181 
-2 0.0008 03006 00014 05447 0.0005 0.1943 
-I -0.0010 -04170 00004 0.1693 -00031 -12475 
0 -0.0074 -2.9600 ••• 0.0002 0.0920 0.0102 4.0647 ••• 
I -0.0049 -1.9595 • -00026 -1.0415 00088 3.5181 ••• 
2 -0.0013 -0.5178 -0.0031 -1.2556 00131 5.2402 ••• 
3 -00074 -2.9581 ••• -0.0023 -09283 00123 4.9364 ••• 
4 -00174 -6.9724 ••• -0.0054 -2.1520 •• -0.0005 -0.1811 
5 -00117 -4.6648 ••• 00029 I 1601 00013 0.5112 
6 -00051 -2.0208 •• -00020 -07847 -0.0007 -02653 
7 -00029 -1 1445 -0.0041 -1.6571 • -00011 -0 4358 
8 -0 0066 -2.6362 ••• 00033 1 3035 -00024 -09455 
9 -00085 -3.4128 ••• 00000 -00031 00033 1 3277 
10 -0.0063 -2.5168 •• -0.0036 -14564 00039 1 5650 











Table 11: Results of Si{.fni/icance Testsfor CAARs as Per News Categorv 
CUMULA T1VE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Day Bad News t-stat sil!nif No News t-stat si!!nif Good News t-stat si!!nif 
-10 00050 1.9937 •• -00016 -06198 00005 02116 
-9 00017 0.6925 0.0019 0.7520 -00041 -1.6294 
-8 -00020 -07916 0.0053 2.\325 •• -00035 -I 4123 
-7 -00095 -3.7835 ••• 0.0020 07987 00008 03315 
-6 -0.0198 -7.8988 ••• 0.0013 0.5211 0.0005 01874 
-5 -0.0202 -8.0591 ••• 0.0013 05196 -00029 -I 1657 
-4 -00074 -2.9680 ••• -0 0030 -I 2181 00053 2.1249 •• 
-3 -0 0075 -3.0063 ••• -00006 -02268 00050 2.0068 •• 
-2 -0 0068 -2.7057 ••• 0.0008 0.3179 00055 2.2012 •• 
-I -0.0078 -3.1227 ••• 0.0012 0.4873 0.0024 0.9536 
0 -00152 -6.0827 ••• 0.0014 0.5793 00126 5.0183 ••• 
1 -0 0201 -8.0422 ••• -00012 -0 4622 00214 8.5364 ••• 
2 -0.0214 -8.5600 ••• -00043 -1.7178 • 0.0345 13.7766 ••• 
3 -00288 -11.5180 ••• -0 0066 -2.6461 ••• 00468 18.7129 ••• 
4 -0 0463 -18.4905 ••• -00120 -4.7981 ••• 0.0464 18.5319 ••• 
5 -0 0579 -23.1553 ••• -00091 -3.6380 ••• 00476 19.0431 ... 
6 -0 0630 -25.1761 ••• -0.0111 -4.4227 ••• 00470 18.7778 ••• 
7 -0 0658 -26.3205 ••• -0.0152 -6.0798 ... 00459 18.3421 ••• 
8 -0 0724 -28.9567 ••• -0 0119 -4.7763 ••• 0.0435 17.3966 ... 
9 -0.0810 -32.3695 ••• -00120 -4.7794 ••• 0.0468 18.7243 ••• 
10 -0 0873 -34.8863 ••• -00 156 -6.2358 ••• 00508 20.2893 ••• 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the IO%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
The existence of abnormal returns before the event day may on the one hand suggest 
that investors are privy to information before it is made public (Insider Trading). 
However, if this were the case the share price would assimilate the new information to 
the point where the earnings announcement would be a "Non-Event" resulting in no 
significant price change after the announcement. The existence of abnormal returns 
post-event contradicts this and implies that even if investors were privy to inside 
information they were unable to gain from it, or there are other factors driving the 
persistent abnormal returns. 
Table 12 below gives the results of the Wilcoxon Test performed on the different news 
categories and the results confirm those of the t tests above, in that there are significant 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements and depending on the news type these 
may be exploited by investors. A buy-and-hold strategy may work well if the investor 
correctly classifies an event as good news, while the bad news announcements may 
need the investor to sell shares and buy back when the CAARs bottom out. Given the 











~ bl 12 IV< P ·R IF"< hlV< C a e : on- aramelTlc esu Is or I e ews aleJ!oTles 
Wilcoxon Si ned Rank Test: Output 
Bad News No News Good News 
N 378 420 357 
SN+ 27263.00 41325.00 38124.50 
SN. 44368.00 47085.00 25778.50 
Z -4.0236 -1.1572 3.1633 
p value 0.00005747 0.2474 0.00156 
5. Conclusions 
The paper tested for the semi-strong form of market efficiency in an attempt to establish 
the existence of a market disciplining mechanism for bank equity. The presence of 
which, would suggest the ability of investors to timeously acquire and process available 
information relevant to particular banks. Such a mechanism, if in place, can greatly 
enhance the overall regulatory efficiency, as the efforts of investors will compliment 
those of the Central Bank. The importance of complimentarity cannot be overstated for 
developing countries where the resources (time, and most importantly financial and 
human) are limited. 
The results are consistent with existing literature on the efficiency of the JSE, which 
finds the market to be only weak-form efficient. The persistence of abnormal returns 
provides opportunities for investors to exploit the market with appropriate tools. This 
persistence is not a recent phenomenon, suggesting (a) the markets have failed to 
exploit the anomalies to the point where they disappear; and (b) the JSE is driven by 
much more than fundamentals. Secondly, the process of information dissemination is 
poor as indicated by the extended post-announcement drift. This would be of concern to 
the regulator looking to place some form of accountability on investors for their 
investment decisions. Further research as to the channels used, and their effectiveness 
would be informative. 
None, except condition 8, of the necessary conditions for Market Discipline (Table 2 on 
page 3) are met. Indicating the markets do not provide clear signals because these under 











condition 8 is met, but whether or not this premium reflects bank-specific risks is a 
topic for further research. 
In addition future research into the channels, procedures and the time it takes for 
investors to acquire information, process it and make a decision as to whether buy, sell 
or do nothing and actually have the decision acted upon would be insightful. In addition 
the question of how investors access the information is important (newspapers, brokers, 
live feeds, etc) may help explain the perceived delays in reacting to announcements. 
Finally, the debate in modern market efficiency literature has been around the 
forecasting ability of models. With the existing models unable to replicate the large 
variations in the share price from period to period and coupled with the cost of 
information especially in developing countries it is difficult to conclusively state that 
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